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ABSTRACT 
 
Are Risk Aversion and Impatience Related to Cognitive Ability? 
 
Is the way that people make risky choices, or tradeoffs over time, related to cognitive ability? 
This paper investigates whether there is a link between cognitive ability, risk aversion, and 
impatience, using a representative sample of the population and incentive compatible 
measures. We conduct choice experiments measuring risk aversion, and impatience over an 
annual time horizon, for a randomly drawn sample of roughly 1,000 German adults. Subjects 
also take part in two different tests of cognitive ability, which correspond to sub-modules of 
one of the most widely used IQ tests. Interviews are conducted in subjects' own homes. We 
find that lower cognitive ability is associated with greater risk aversion, and more pronounced 
impatience. These relationships are significant, and robust to controlling for personal 
characteristics, educational attainment, income, and measures of credit constraints. We 
perform a series of additional robustness checks, which help rule out other possible 
confounds. 
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1 Introduction
Preferences and cognitive ability are fundamental determinants of decision-making in eco-
nomic models. Their importance is confirmed empirically by studies showing that individ-
ual measures of risk aversion and impatience predict a wide range of important economic
outcomes (e.g., Guiso and Paiella, 2005; Eckel et al., 2005), and by the literature showing
that higher cognitive ability is associated with better labor market outcomes (e.g., Heck-
man et al., 2006).1 In economic models and applications, cognitive ability, risk aversion,
and impatience are also typically treated as independent traits. This assumption, however,
has received relatively little attention in the empirical literature.
This paper tests whether risk aversion and impatience are related to cognitive abil-
ity. We use a sample of more than 1,000 adults living in Germany, randomly drawn to be
representative of the population, which enhances the generalizability of our findings (List,
2003; Levitt and List, 2007). Subjects made choices in paid experiments, which provide in-
centive compatible and controlled measures of risk aversion and impatience. The measure
of risk aversion involved choices over real-stakes lotteries, and the measure of impatience
involved making tradeoffs between payments available immediately and payments avail-
able in one year. Subjects also took two different tests of cognitive ability, each based on
a different sub-module of one of the most widely used IQ tests. A questionnaire collected
information on various personal and background characteristics, to serve as controls in the
empirical analysis. The questionnaire and experiments were conducted in subjects’ own
homes.
Our main finding is that risk aversion and impatience are systematically related to
cognitive ability. Individuals with higher cognitive ability are significantly more willing to
take risks in the lottery experiments, and are significantly more patient over the year-long
time horizon studied in the intertemporal choice experiment. These results are robust to
controlling for exogenous personal characteristics, such as age and gender, which could be
related to cognitive ability and could also have an impact on willingness to take risks or
patience. The baseline results are also robust to using different estimation methods.
1 For additional evidence on risk aversion see: Barsky et al. (1997); Guiso and Paiella, 2001; Dohmen et
al. (2005); Bonin et al. (2006). For evidence on impatience and behavior see: Ventura (2003); Kirby and
Petry (2004); Borghans and Golsteyn (2005); Eckel et al. (2005). For additional evidence on cognitive
ability, see: Herrnstein and Murray (1994); Murnane et al. (1995); Cawley et al. (2001); Bowles et al.,
(2001).
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To further investigate the robustness of the main findings, we control for charac-
teristics such as schooling, income, and credit constraints. Adding these controls helps
address the question of whether there is a direct relationship between cognitive ability,
risk aversion, and impatience, or whether cognitive ability is related to these traits only
indirectly, through the channel of fostering greater educational attainment, or higher in-
come. We find that the results are still strong when we include these additional controls,
suggesting that cognitive ability does not operate solely through these indirect channels.
Another question is whether low cognitive ability could be unrelated to the traits
of interest, but could cause people to have trouble understanding the incentives faced
in our choice experiments, in a way that happens to look like, e.g., risk aversion. We
check whether the results are robust to using a very simple survey question to measure
willingness to take risks, for which there is little scope for such confusion. We find a
significant relationship between cognitive ability and the survey measure of willingness to
take risks, suggesting that the results based on the experimental measures are not due to
confusion. A different concern arises in the case of the intertemporal choice experiment if
people with higher cognitive ability adopt a strategy of arbitrage between high returns from
the experiment and lower market interest rates. We asked subjects whether they thought
about market interest rates during the experiment, however, and find that the relationship
between cognitive ability and impatience is robust to excluding those individuals who
thought about interest rates. We also find no indication that the baseline correlations
are spurious, due to an impact of risk aversion or impatience on the way individuals take
tests. For example, risk averse people might adopt an overly-cautious test-taking strategy,
and impatient people might adopt an overly-hasty test-taking strategy. We find, however,
that there is no significant relationship between these traits and error rates in our tests of
cognitive ability.
An interesting question is whether measures of cognitive ability may partly proxy
for personality traits measured by the “Big Five” scale from psychology, such as conscien-
tiousness, rather than intelligence.2 If this were the case, our results could be interpreted
as showing a link between risk aversion, impatience, and personality traits studied in psy-
chology, which would itself be an important finding. We do find that personality type
2 See Segal (2006) and Borghans et al. (2007) for discussions on whether tests of cognitive ability may
partly proxy for personality traits rather than intelligence.
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is related to risk aversion and impatience in ways that are intuitive: openness to new
experiences, and extroversion, are positively correlated with willingness to take risks, and
impatience, respectively. Controlling for personality traits does not, however, eliminate
the strong and significant correlation between test scores and risk aversion or impatience.
Finally, we explore whether the results for impatience could be explained by a link
between cognitive ability and curvature of utility, rather than a direct relationship be-
tween cognitive ability and time preference. In the canonical case of Expected Utility
Theory (EUT), greater concavity of utility can lead to more impatient choices, for the
same annual discount rate. Given that we find greater risk aversion for people with lower
cognitive ability, which is equivalent to more extreme concavity in EUT, this could poten-
tially be a mechanism underlying the negative correlation between cognitive ability and
impatience observed in the data. This would not change the importance of our finding
that people with low cognitive ability exhibit more impatient behavior, because of the
important implications for investment decisions, but it would shed a different light on the
underlying mechanism. In an empirical test, where we allow concavity to affect choices
in the intertemporal choice experiment, the emerging picture supports a direct impact of
cognitive ability on discount rates.
In summary, this paper documents a systematic relationship between cognitive abil-
ity, risk aversion, and impatience: people with higher cognitive ability are significantly
more willing to take risks, and are significantly more patient. There are a number of
studies from psychology that have also explored the relationship between cognitive ability
and impatience: most studies find that IQ measures or math SAT scores are positively re-
lated to patience, although some studies find no significant relationship.3 There has been
little work on cognitive ability and risk-taking. A drawback of the psychology literature is
that most results are simple correlations without controls, and in some cases measures of
impatience are only hypothetical. Also, the literature has focused almost exclusively on
young children or students.4 Recently, there has been some work on these topics in the
economics literature. Some studies provide indirect evidence, e.g., showing that aversion
3 For psychological evidence on the relationship between intelligence and the ability to delay gratification
see, e.g., Funder and Block (1989), Shoda et al. (1990), Kirby et al. (2005), Parker and Fischoff (2005).
A recent meta-analysis concludes that overall there is a weak to moderate relationship between cognitive
ability and patience (see Shamosh and Gray, 2007).
4 One exception is the study by Monterosso et al. (2001), on impatience of cocaine addicts, which finds
no relationship with cognitive ability.
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to losses is less pronounced among people with more education (e.g., Guiso and Paiella,
2005; Ga¨chter et al., 2006), and that precision in probabilistic thinking relates to portfolio
choice (Lillard and Willis, 2001). There are also two studies that provide evidence on a link
to achievement test scores, or other more direct measures of cognitive ability. Benjamin et
al. (2005) use the senior class of a Chilean high school and relate math SAT scores (or the
Chilean equivalent) to choices involving real rewards. They find that students with lower
math scores are more likely to make impatient choices (e.g., preferring $0.79 today over
$1.50 in one week), and are less likely to be risk neutral (e.g., preferring $0.40 for sure over
$1.50 or 0 with equal probability). Frederick (2006) finds results that point in a similar
direction, based on samples of college students and adults in the U.S, from various studies.
In particular, several measures of cognitive ability are positively correlated with different
measures of patience (although math SAT is not significantly related to patience, unlike
in Benjamin et al., 2005). Cognitive ability is also positively correlated with willingness
to take risks in lotteries, when outcomes are in the gain domain, but negatively correlated
when outcomes include losses.5
Different from previous papers, we investigate these issues using a large data set,
carefully constructed to be representative of the adult population. In addition to being
representative, the data allows us to control for various important background character-
istics. The measures of risk aversion and impatience involve real monetary choices, with
relatively large stakes, and relatively long time horizons in the case of the impatience mea-
sures. We combine these experiments with two measures of cognitive ability taken from
a prominent IQ test. We also perform a series of additional robustness checks to rule out
confounds, such as confusion about incentives, or an impact of risk aversion on test-taking
strategy, that could drive our findings, and the findings of previous studies.
The findings in this paper are potentially relevant for the specification of economic
models that incorporate both cognitive ability and time or risk preferences as fundamen-
tal parameters. Typically, structural models of this type do not explicitly allow for the
dependency identified by our results. There are some exceptions, including Heckman et
al. (2006), who allow for cognitive ability to affect the discount rate, and vice versa, in
a formal model explaining labor market and behavioral outcomes. However, they do not
5 There were different questions about tradeoffs over time, and risky choice, with various stakes. Risk
measures were hypothetical. One of the impatience measures involved real money: subjects indicated
the amount in 4 days that would make them indifferent to $170 in two months.
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observe the discount rate directly, so when they estimate the model they cannot identify
the impact of cognitive ability on time preferences separately from its impact on other
unobserved variables such as human capital productivity, and direct market productivity.
Our findings provide an empirical basis for the flexible approach adopted by Heckman
et al. (2006), and shed light on the specific nature of the relationship between cognitive
ability and preferences regarding risk and time.
The paper also points to a different interpretation of reduced form models that
have been estimated in the literature on cognitive ability and labor market outcomes.
These models have typically included a measure of cognitive abilities, but not risk aversion
or impatience, as explanatory variables (e.g., Cawley et al., 2001).6 Outcomes such as
educational attainment or wages may by affected by risk aversion and impatience, and
thus part of the impact of cognitive ability may reflect the correlation with these traits.
In other words, our findings point to a potentially important source of omitted variable
bias in this type of estimation.
Given that cognitive ability is known to be transmitted from parents to children,
our findings could also be relevant for the literature on intergenerational transmission of
preferences and socio-economic status.7 For example, Dohmen et al. (2006) show that
attitudes towards risk are strongly correlated between parents and children, and a large
literature on social mobility documents strong intergenerational correlations in important
economic outcomes that are plausibly related to risk attitudes, or patience, such as wealth,
income, occupation, and education (for a recent example documenting correlation in in-
come and education, see Bjo¨rklund et al., 2006).8 To the extent that cognitive ability
affects risk aversion and impatience, consistent with our findings, the transmission of cog-
nitive ability could be one channel explaining intergenerational correlation in traits such
as risk aversion and impatience, which in turn could help explain persistence of economic
outcomes.
Our findings are also potentially relevant for the literature investigating the rela-
tionship between the distribution of cognitive ability and inequality in economic outcomes
6 See also: Herrnstein and Murray (1994); Murnane et al. (1995); Neal and Johnson (1996).
7 For evidence on intergenerational transmission of cognitive ability, see Bouchard and McGue (1981) and
Plomin et al. (2000).
8 Other examples from this large literature include: Kerckhoff et al. (1985), Solon (1992),Mulligan (1999),
Plug and Vijverberg (2003), Black et al. (2005), Long and Ferrie (2005).
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(e.g., Leuven et al., 2004; Blau and Kahn, 2005). If people who have high cognitive abil-
ity are more patient, and thus more likely to make investments, and if they earn a risk
premium from being less risk averse, this would exacerbate differences in inequality asso-
ciated with differences in cognitive ability. Reduced form models that include cognitive
ability but do not control for differences in risk aversion or impatience across countries
may deliver biased estimates of the impact of cognitive ability on inequality. Also, for a
given distribution of cognitive ability, the degree of inequality in economic outcomes is
likely to be greater than if there was not a link with risk aversion and impatience.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the measures of
cognitive ability and preferences. Section 3 presents our main results. Section 4 presents
a series of additional robustness checks and results. Section 5 concludes by discussing
potential mechanisms, policy implications, and directions for future research.
2 Data Description
2.1 Design of the Study
The data were collected as part of a study run between June 9th and July 4th, 2005. We
conducted the study using the same professional surveying company that administers the
German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), a large panel data set for Germany (for a detailed
description of the SOEP see Haisken-DeNew and Frick, 2003; Schupp and Wagner, 2002;
Wagner et al., 2007). Sampling was done according to the same procedure used to generate
the SOEP sample, and individuals were visited by interviewers in their own homes.9 Our
sample was constructed so as to be representative of the adult population, age 17 and
older, living in Germany. In total our data include interviews with 1,012 participants.
Participants in our study went through a computer assisted personal interview
(CAPI) conducted with a laptop. The interview consisted of two parts. First, subjects
answered a detailed questionnaire. The items in the questionnaire were presented in the
standard format used by the SOEP. Topics included demographic characteristics, financial
situation, health, and attitudes. The full questionnaire, in German and translated into
9 For each of 179 randomly chosen primary sampling units (voting districts), an interviewer was given
a randomly chosen starting address. Starting at that specific local address, the interviewer contacted
every third household and had to motivate one adult person aged 17 or older to participate. For a
detailed discussion of the random walk method of sampling see Thompson (2006).
6
English, is available upon request. The questionnaire also contained two tests of cognitive
ability. At the end of the questionnaire, subjects were invited to participate in the second
part of the interview, which consisted of a paid experiment. A random device in the CAPI
software determined whether a subject was invited to participate in a lottery experiment
designed to measure the extent of risk aversion, or an intertemporal choice experiment
designed to elicit impatience over an annual horizon. Neither the interviewer nor the par-
ticipant had an impact on the selection of the type of the experiment. We deliberately
designed the study such that an individual could only take part in one experiment so as
to avoid order effects. Of all 532 subjects who were invited to take part in the discount
rate experiment 500 participated, while 452 out of 480 potential participants took part in
the lottery choice experiment.
2.2 Measures of Cognitive Ability
Each of the two tests of cognitive ability in our questionnaire is similar to a different
module of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS), one of the most widely-used
intelligence tests worldwide (see Tewes, 1991).10 The Wechsler test has 11 modules, 6
verbal and 5 non-verbal. One of our tests, the symbol correspondence test, is similar to a
sub-module in the non-verbal section of the WAIS, which asks subjects to match as many
numbers and symbols as possible in 90 seconds according to a given correspondence. Our
other test, the word fluency test is similar to one of the verbal sub-modules of the WAIS,
in which subjects are given a timed vocabulary test. Our tests were designed to capture
the aspects of intelligence measured by these sub-modules, while also being suitable for
implementation in the field as part of a CAPI interview, rather than in the usual paper and
pencil format of the WAIS. Previously, the symbol correspondence test and word fluency
test used in our study have been shown to be strongly correlated with the corresponding
modules of the German version of the WAIS, as well as with the remaining modules, and
with scores on other prominent intelligence tests (Lang et al., 2005; Lang et al., 2007).
The symbol correspondence test presented subjects with nine unfamiliar symbols,
each paired with one of the digits 1 through 9. After brief instructions, subjects were
presented with a screen that had this same mapping from numbers to symbols at the
10 We used the German version of the test, which is known as the Hamburger-Wechsler Intelligenztest fu¨r
Erwachsene (HAWIE-R).
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top. A symbol, with a blank box beneath it, was presented in the center of that screen.
Subjects had to type the correct corresponding number into the box. Once a number was
entered, a new screen with another symbol appeared. Subjects had 90 seconds to find
as many correspondences between symbols and numbers as they could, using the correct
number for each symbol. Thus, speed and accuracy in applying the given correspondence
under time pressure determine how well an individual does on the test. A total of 105
persons refused to participate, and procedural problems arose in some cases, so we have
non-missing symbol-correspondence scores for a total of 902 subjects.
The word fluency test asked subjects to verbally list as many animals as they could
in 90 seconds. After each naming, the interviewer pressed one of three keys, to indicate
a correct animal name, a name repetition, or the statement of a wrong or unclear name,
respectively.11 Before the test started, subjects were asked whether they wanted to par-
ticipate, and 87 subjects refused to take part. Some of the participants who had agreed to
participate changed their minds just after the experiment began, and stopped. In a few
other cases, procedural problems arose, mostly because interviewers made input errors,
for example forgetting to press a key after the interviewee had named an animal. In total,
we have word fluency scores for 848 individuals.
Figure 1 shows the resulting distributions of cognitive ability in our data. The upper
graph in the figure is the histogram of correct answers on the symbol correspondence
test. Overlaid is a graph of the smoothed density function of the distribution of symbol
correspondence test scores, estimated using a Gaussian kernel.12 A normal density function
is also plotted in the graph, with the same mean and variance as the estimated density.
The figure shows that the estimated density function for the symbol correspondence test
is close to the normal density, or a “bell-shaped curve”, consistent with the usual finding
from the literature on cognitive ability. The lower graph of the figure shows the histogram
of the number of correct recalls in the word fluency test. Graphs of the smoothed density
function are estimated in the same way as in the upper graph, and a normal density is
11 Lang et al. (2005) assessed the error-proneness of this procedure in a laboratory experiment in which
they tape-recorded the tests and then compared the correct test results with those resulting from
interviewers’ entries. On average interviewers were slightly off, recording 0.4 fewer correct answers than
the true total. Ceteris paribus this recording error makes the word fluency test a more noisy measure
than the symbol correspondence test, where there is no scope for recording error, due to computerization
of the procedure.
12 The bandwidth is chosen to minimize the mean integrated squared error if the data were Gaussian.
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included in the same way as well. The estimated density for the word fluency test is also
close to normal.
To ease the interpretation of our results, we use standardized measures of the test
scores in our analysis. The upper graph in Figure 2 shows separate kernel density estimates
of the standardized distributions of the symbol correspondence test, for the participants in
the lottery experiment and the intertemporal choice experiment, respectively. A standard
normal distribution is overlaid on the graph. One important observation is that the
distribution is very similar across sub-samples. The hypothesis that the distribution of
scores is the same for both sub-samples cannot be rejected using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test (p-value= 0.487). Also, for both sub-samples we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
estimated distribution is normal at the five-percent level, using a joint test of skewness
and kurtosis. The lower graph in the figure makes a similar comparison based on the
word fluency test. Again, the distributions are not significantly different across the sub-
samples for the lottery and intertemporal choice experiments (p-value= 0.396). Although
the distributions look close to normal for both sub-samples, in the case of the word fluency
test we reject normality at the five-percent level. Our results are robust if we instead use
the non-standardized measures.13
2.3 Experimental Measures of Risk Aversion and Impatience
We used paid experiments to measure willingness to take risks and impatience. As de-
scribed above, it was randomly determined whether a subject was invited to participate
in the lottery experiment or the intertemporal choice experiment. The exact script and
instructions used in the experiments are presented in Appendix B below, translated from
German into English.
For both experiments, the first step in the procedure involved the experimenter
presenting subjects with an example choice table. The experimenter explained the types
of choices that the subject would make in the table, and how payment would work. In
particular, subjects were informed that the experiment would involve multiple choices,
one for each row of the table, and that one table row would be randomly selected after all
choices had been made, and that the choice in this row would potentially be relevant for
13 Results with the non-standardized measures are available upon request.
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their payoff. Subjects also knew that at the end of the experiment a random device would
determine whether they were actually paid, with the probability of being paid equal to 1/7.
This procedure gives subjects an incentive to choose according to their true preferences in
each row, and thus is incentive compatible. After explaining the nature of the experiment
and the rules for payment, the experimenter asked subjects whether they were willing to
participate. Subjects who agreed to participate were given further instructions, and then
allowed to ask questions. Once there were no more questions, the experiment began, and
subjects were asked to make their actual choices, referring to the choice table.
We elicited willingness to take risks using choices between a paid lottery and different
safe payments. Participants made choices in a table with 20 rows. In each row they had to
decide whether they preferred a safe option or playing a lottery. In the lottery they could
win either 300 Euros or 0 Euros, each with 50 percent probability (at the time, 1 Euro
∼ $ US 1.2). In each row the lottery was exactly the same but the safe option increased
from row to row. In the first row the safe option was 0 Euros, in the second it was 10
Euros, and so on up to 190 Euros in row 20.
If subjects have monotonic preferences, they prefer the lottery up to a certain level
of the safe option, and then switch to preferring the safe option in all subsequent rows of
the choice table (see also Holt and Laury, 2002, who use a similar choice-table procedure)
In our procedure, subjects were asked for their choices one row at a time, starting from
the top of the table. Once a subject expressed a preference for the safe option instead
of the lottery, the experimenter asked if the subject would also prefer all higher values
of the safe option as well. If the answer was affirmative, the experimenter filled in the
rest of the choices accordingly. Otherwise the subject could continue making choices in
the table. In all cases, subjects responded in the affirmative. The switching point in the
lottery experiment is informative about a subject’s willingness to take risks. Since the
expected value of the lottery is 150 Euros, weakly risk averse subjects should prefer safe
options that are smaller than or equal to 150 Euros over the lottery. Only risk loving
subjects should opt for the lottery when the offered safe option is greater than 150 Euros.
To create an incentive compatible index for how impatient an individual is, we posed
subjects with choices between receiving different payments at different times. As in the
lottery experiment, subjects were presented with a choice table and asked to make a choice
in each row. The decision in the intertemporal choice experiment was always between 100
10
Euros “today” and a larger amount Y that would be received 12 months in the future.
Moving down the table, the early payment was always 100 Euros but the size of the
delayed payment Y increased in each subsequent row. The value of Y in the first row gave
a return of 2.5 percent, assuming semi-annual compounding, and each subsequent value
of Y implied an additional 2.5 percentage point increase in the annual rate of return.14
Observing the value of Y (or equivalently, the implied annual rate of return) necessary to
induce the individual to wait 12 months, we obtain an index of impatience.
Subjects were asked for their decisions one row at a time, starting from the first
row. The first time that a subject switched from 100 Euros to the delayed payment, the
subject was asked whether he or she also preferred to wait for any larger payment, which
all subjects agreed upon. As in the lottery experiment, subjects knew that one row would
be randomly selected at the end of the experiment, and that their decision in that row
could be relevant for their payoff. Subjects also knew that all payments would be sent by
mail following the interview, in the form of a check. Checks for “today” could be cashed
immediately, but checks for payments in 12 months would be cashable only in 12 months.
Our focus in this paper is on the relationship between cognitive ability and impa-
tience, rather than estimating the average level of impatience in the population, but our
design does address an important challenge that arises when trying to precisely measure
the level of impatience. The potential problem is that subjects could be skeptical that
the experimenters will deliver on a promise to make a monetary payment available in the
future. This could cause them to place a premium on payments that are available immedi-
ately at the time of the interview, and thus choose in a way that makes them appear more
impatient than they truly are. In our design, however, there is little scope for credibility
concerns. Subjects know that even the early payment is not available immediately, but
rather is sent by mail shortly after the interview in the form of a check. The timing of the
mailing is thus the same as if the subject is due to receive a check that can only be cashed
in one year’s time. This feature of the design helps make the early and delayed payments
equally credible or “incredible”, and thus mitigates the problem of overstating the level of
14 We chose semi-annual compounding of the annual interest rate because this is a natural compromise
between the two types of compounding German subjects are most familiar with: quarterly compounding
on typical bank accounts, and annual reports on the rate of return from savings accounts, pension funds,
or stock holdings. Using semi-annual compounding also helps avoid prominent round numbers in the
choice table, which could potentially influence switching choices.
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impatience.15
The upper graph of Figure 3 shows the histogram of switching values in the lottery
experiment, which are equivalent to subjects’ certainty equivalents. The main message of
the figure is that there is substantial heterogeneity in willingness to take risks. It is also
noteworthy that the majority of individuals are risk averse. The modal certainty equivalent
is 100 Euros, well below the lottery’s expected value of 150 Euros, and the median certainty
equivalent is 80 Euros. These values are in line with previous evidence from laboratory
experiments and field experiments that measure the degree of risk aversion.16 Overall,
the majority of subjects (77.8 percent) exhibit risk aversion in the lottery experiment,
preferring a certainty equivalent strictly smaller than the expected value of the lottery to
playing the lottery. The fraction of risk-seeking subjects is small (9.1 percent). As is typical
in choice experiments, there is also some evidence that subjects tend to choose prominent
numbers more often (e.g., 50, 100, 150). In the analysis we use estimation techniques that
correct for the fact that willingness to take risks is measured in intervals, and thus is left-
and right-censored, and we check robustness of our results to using broader intervals that
eliminate much of the lumpiness of the distribution around prominent numbers.
The lower graph of Figure 3 shows the histogram of switching values in the intertem-
poral choice experiment. Again, the main message of the figure is that there is substantial
heterogeneity. It is noteworthy that the implied level is similar to that in other recent
studies that use behavior in the field to infer impatience.17 Note that there is a spike in the
15 Furthermore, experiments and payments were administered by the professional surveying agency used
for the SOEP, which is highly credible and well known to the public because of its role in conducting
election polls for German public television. Interviewers also left their contact details at the end of the
experiment, making it easy for subjects to contact the institute. There were no reports, from any of
the interviewers, about subjects expressing concerns regarding credibility of payments. Thus, it is very
unlikely that subjects perceived either future or immediate payments in the experiment as being less
than fully credible.
16 Previous studies using lottery experiments have often assumed a CRRA utility function, and utility
defined over outcomes in the experiment rather than final wealth levels, in order to infer a risk preference
parameter (but see Rabin, 2000, for a criticism of this approach). Applying these assumptions to our
data for the sake of comparability yields mean and median coefficients of relative risk aversion that fall
in the range between 0.48 and 0.43. This is similar to the range of 0.3 to 0.5 found by Holt and Laury
(2002) in laboratory experiments with college students, and is reasonably close to the value 0.67 found
by Harrison et al. (forthcoming) in a field experiment with people in Denmark.
17 Under certain assumptions it is possible to infer an annual discount rate from switching rows in the
experiment, and to compare to annual discount rates estimated in previous studies that make similar
assumptions. For example, with locally-linear utility and semi-annual compounding of the annual dis-
count rate, the lower bound for the annual discount rate is given by the formula 100 ∗ (1 + δ/2)2 = Z,
where Z is the largest value of the delayed payment such that the individual still prefers 100 Euros
today. The upper bound is calculated as 100 ∗ (1 + δ¯/2)2 = Y , where Y is the value of the delayed pay-
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figure in the highest category of impatience; this reflects individuals who are so impatient
that they prefer the early payment even in the final row of the choice table. There is again
some evidence that prominent numbers affect choices: switching is slightly more common
in rows where the delayed payment surpasses prominent numbers, for example 110 Euros,
or 120 Euros, although this feature of choices appears less pronounced than in the lottery
experiment. In the analysis we take steps to correct for left and right censoring of the im-
patience measure, and check robustness to using intervals that mitigate lumpiness around
prominent numbers.
3 Results
We begin our empirical analysis by looking at the relationship between cognitive ability,
risk aversion, and impatience in the raw data. The upper graph in Figure 4 shows the
average values of our indexes of willingness to take risks, and impatience, for each decile of
the distribution of cognitive ability as measured by the symbol correspondence test. The
lower graph displays similar information, but using performance on the word fluency test
as the measure of cognitive ability. For both measures, the average degree of impatience
is clearly lower for higher deciles of the ability distribution. Also, for both measures
the average certainty equivalent is increasing in the level of cognitive ability, indicating
greater willingness to take risks. Thus, the figure provides an initial indication that both
willingness to take risks and patience are systematically related to cognitive ability.
In order to assess whether these relationships are statistically significant, and whether
they are robust to controlling for personal characteristics, we next regress our measures
of risk aversion and impatience on cognitive ability and controls. Table 1 presents the
results. The dependent variable in columns (1) to (4) is the switching row in the lottery
experiment. A higher switching row indicates a higher certainty equivalent, and thus a
greater willingness to take risks. The dependent variable in columns (5) to (8) is the
ment in the next row of the table, i.e., the smallest delayed payment that makes the individual willing
to switch to waiting one year. An individual’s true discount rate δ lies within this interval, δ ∈ ˆδ, δ¯˜.
The resulting median discount rate falls in the range of 27.5 to 30 percent. Harrison et al. (2002) make
similar assumptions, except using quarterly instead of semi-annual compounding, and find an average
annual discount rate of 28.1 percent in their field experiment with individuals in Denmark. Warner and
Pleeter (2001) provide evidence on annual discount rates for a large number of individuals in the U.S.
military, inferred from very high stakes choices between different voluntary separation options. They
find an average annual discount rate ranging from 10 to 19 percent for officers and from 35 to 55 percent
for enlisted soldiers.
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switching row in the intertemporal choice experiment. A higher value indicates that an
individual needs a higher rate of return to forgo the immediate payment and wait one
year, and thus greater impatience. To account for the fact that the dependent variables
are measured in intervals, and thus that all observations are right and left censored, the
regressions are estimated using interval regression techniques.18 Coefficient estimates are
marginal effects; robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Unless otherwise noted,
all subsequent tables in the paper also report interval regressions, and robust standard
errors. In all regressions we use the standardized measures of the cognitive ability as
explanatory variables.
Column (1) shows that people with better performance on the symbol correspon-
dence test exhibit greater willingness to take risks in the lottery experiment. The effect is
only slightly smaller, and is still significant at the five percent level, when we also control
for personal characteristics in column (2). We find a similarly large and significant rela-
tionship between cognitive ability and risk taking if we instead use the word fluency test
as the measure of cognitive ability (columns (3) and (4)). The magnitude is also econom-
ically significant: a one standard deviation increase in cognitive ability is associated with
a shift of about one switching row, which corresponds to a 12.5 percent increase in the
certainty equivalent for the median subject in our sample.19
Turning to impatience, columns (5) to (8) show that people with higher cognitive
ability are significantly more patient, i.e., switch significantly earlier in the choice table
in the experiment. This result is robust to controlling for personal characteristics. The
magnitude of the coefficient, and the level of statistical significance, are slightly lower in
18 The procedure maximizes a likelihood function that is a natural generalization of a Tobit, treating each
value as a left and right censored observation coming from an interval with known bounds. Error terms
are assumed to be normally distributed. For more information, see the STATA reference manual on the
intreg procedure listed under Tobit estimation.
19 Notably, this result does not appear to be driven by an impact of cognitive ability on understanding of
expected values, or the use of expected value as a choice heuristic. If this were the case, we would expect
cognitive ability to have an impact mainly by increasing the probability of switching exactly in those
rows that corresponding to risk neutrality (rows 15 and 16). We do not, however, observe an especially
large impact of cognitive ability on the tendency to be risk neutral. In fact, only 4 percent more subjects
switch at risk neutrality among the top quartile of the symbol correspondence distribution, compared
to the bottom quartile. Instead, in the data we observe that higher cognitive ability shifts the entire
distribution of switching rows in the direction of greater willingness to take risks. We reach a similar
conclusion if we estimate probit regressions, where the dependent variable is equal to 1 in the case of risk
neutrality. Cognitive ability does not have a significant impact on the probability of being risk neutral
(p < 0.313; detailed results available upon request). Thus, the results in Table 1 reflect a tendency for
higher cognitive ability to make people less risk averse in general.
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the regressions that use word fluency as the measure of cognitive ability. This could reflect
greater measurement error in the word fluency test, or could indicate that impatience is
less strongly related to verbal ability. The magnitude of the effects is again economically
significant: the coefficients imply that a one standard deviation increase in cognitive ability
leads an individual to switch about one row earlier, corresponding to a 9 percent decrease
in the rate of return needed to induce the median individual to switch to preferring the
delayed payment.
The results in Table 1 are robust to using different estimation techniques. For
example, in Table A.1 in Appendix A we show that results are similar if we use OLS instead
of interval regression. In other regressions we try a different approach to dealing with the
fact that the dependent variables are censored, and use a Cox mixed proportional hazards
model. We estimate the impact of cognitive ability on the hazard of switching in the choice
tables, from the lottery to the safe payment in the risk experiment, and from the immediate
to the delayed payment in the intertemporal choice experiment. We find similar results in
this case: the coefficient estimates show that higher cognitive ability significantly decreases
the hazard of switching in the risk experiment, which corresponds to greater willingness to
take risks, and increases the hazard of switching in the intertermporal choice experiment,
which corresponds to greater patience. Finally, we also explore the robustness of the results
to collapsing the preference measures into broader intervals around prominent numbers.
This makes sense if some of the people who switch at prominent numbers in fact prefer
to switch a row earlier or a row later, but are “attracted” by the prominent number and
switch at that point by mistake. Table A.1 in Appendix A shows that we find similar
results when we use these smoothed measures, which use intervals of 3 or 4 switching
rows, rather than intervals containing single rows.
Overall, the baseline results are consistent with greater willingness to take risks,
and greater patience, among those with relatively high cognitive ability. This is true
controlling for personal characteristics, and using various estimation strategies. In the
following sub-sections we do a series of additional robustness checks, to rule out various
alternative explanations for the apparent link between cognitive ability, risk aversion, and
impatience.
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4 Robustness Checks
4.1 The Role of Education
In this sub-section we explore whether the baseline results are robust to controlling for edu-
cation. Higher cognitive ability is typically associated with higher educational attainment
(see Card, 1999). In fact, both of our measures of cognitive ability are strong predictors
of educational attainment: people in our sample who have higher cognitive ability are
significantly more likely to go to school longer and/or to obtain advanced schooling de-
grees. Results from a multinomial Logit estimation, with different degree categories as
the dependent variable, and cognitive ability and personal characteristics as explanatory
variables, show that high cognitive ability increases the likelihood of acquiring an ad-
vanced degree.20 One could hypothesize that education, in turn, might affect preferences,
in particular discount rates (see, e.g., Becker and Mulligan, 1997). In order to see whether
cognitive ability has a direct impact on preferences, or whether it operates only indirectly
through the channel of education, it is desirable to investigate whether the baseline results
change if we control for education.
There is also another rationale for controlling for education, namely the potential
for education to determine cognitive ability. Previous evidence suggests that educational
attainment affects performance on the AFQT (Hansen et al., 2004; Cascio and Lewis,
2006). This is less likely to be the case for our measures of ability, which are not as
dependent on accumulated knowledge or experience. However, to the extent that our
measures of cognitive ability are partly a proxy for education, some of the impact of
cognitive ability in Table 1 could reflect the impact of education, which was omitted from
the regressions.
Table 2 presents the same regressions as in Table 1, but adding dummy variables
for different educational degrees. This is a better measure of educational attainment for
Germany than years of schooling, because of the structure of the German educational
system (see Card, 1999, p. 1806). In teenage years, German students select into different
types of high schools, some focusing on vocational training, others intended to prepare
students for college. Thus, an equal number of years of education can mean very different
20 Results available upon request.
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things depending on the type of degree. Columns (1) and (3) show that the impact of
both types of cognitive ability on risk preference is only slightly smaller, and remains
significant, once we control for schooling degree. In columns (2) and (4), where we also
control for personal characteristics, both measures of cognitive ability are still significant,
although for the symbol correspondence test significance drops to the ten percent level.
Interestingly, more advanced degrees are significantly positively correlated with willingness
to take risks, as shown by the coefficient on the dummy variable for “Abitur”, which is
the degree completed at the end of a college track high school. In columns (5) to (8),
we see that the symbol correspondence test remains a strong and significant predictor of
impatience, controlling for education and for personal characteristics. The word fluency
test is still significant at the ten percent level when we control for education, but becomes
insignificant (p-value=0.142) once we control for education and exogenous characteristics
simultaneously. Interestingly, however, education is also not significantly correlated with
discount rates, in any of the specifications. In summary, the baseline results are largely
unchanged if we control for education, suggesting that the relationship between cognitive
ability, risk aversion, and impatience does not work solely through the indirect channel of
education.
4.2 The Role of Income and Credit Constraints
Another possibility is that cognitive ability could have an indirect effect through the
channel of income or credit constraints. Higher cognitive ability is associated with higher
income, and higher income could affect willingness to take risks, or willingness to be
patient. For example, someone with higher income may be less worried about taking
a risk and winning nothing, all else equal, because higher income provides a cushion
against negative income shocks. It could also be the case that for people with low income,
choosing the early payment in the intertemporal choice experiment is more attractive,
because they are credit constrained and need the 100 Euros immediately, in order to cover
some important expense. To see whether cognitive ability has a direct impact on the way
that people make choices under uncertainty, or over time, above and beyond these indirect
channels, we add income and a measure of credit constraints to our baseline specifications.
In Table 3 we estimate the same regressions as in Table 1, but add controls for
income and credit constraints. The income variable is current household monthly income,
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net of taxes and benefits (for more details see the table notes). The dummy variable for
credit constraints is based on a question in our questionnaire, which asked the following:
“If you suddenly encountered an unforeseen situation, and had to pay an expense of 1,000
Euros within the next two weeks, would it be possible for you to borrow the money?”
Columns (1) to (4) show that both measures of cognitive ability still have a strong impact
on willingness to take risks, significant at the five percent level, if we control for income,
credit constraints, and personal characteristics. Results in columns (5) to (8) indicate that
cognitive ability measured by the symbol correspondence tests is a significant predictor
of impatience, controlling for income and credit constraints. The coefficients for the word
fluency measure are also statistically significant, except in column 8, where we add all
controls at once and the coefficient is no longer significant (p-value=0.131). Notably, in
all specifications income has a significant positive correlation with willingness to take risks,
and a significant negative correlation with the degree of impatience.
The results are also similar if we control for education and income simultaneously.
The symbol correspondence test has a statistically significant impact on willingness to take
risks and impatience, in all specifications, and the point estimates are largely unchanged.
The word fluency measure is also significant when controlling for both education and
income, except in the fullest specification where it is not quite significant once we control
for personal characteristics as well.21 Thus, the relationship between cognitive ability, risk
aversion, and impatience is not explained entirely by different levels of education, income,
or degree of credit constraints.
4.3 Are the Results Explained by Confusion in the Choice Experiments?
Because we rely on choice experiments to measure willingness to take risks and impatience,
a potential concern is that low cognitive ability could be associated with confusion about
incentives faced in the experiments, in a way that happens to be observationally equivalent
to greater risk aversion, or greater impatience. Confusion is unlikely, given that the
experiments are relatively simple. Also, it is not clear why confusion should be systematic
in a way that would appear as greater risk aversion or impatience.22 In the case of
21 These results are available upon request.
22 In the case of the intertemporal choice experiment, for example, confused individuals could well appear
more patient. For instance, suppose that subjects ignore the time delay, and think that one of the
two columns in the table is randomly selected, rather than one row. Given that payments are always
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willingness to take risks, however, we are able to address this potential confound directly.
Our data include a very simple survey question about risk attitudes that is immune to
problems of confusion about incentives, filling out tables, etc.. The question simply asks
an individual to rate his or her own “willingness to take risks, in general” on a scale from
0 to 10, where 0 is “completely unwilling” and 10 is “completely willing.” In previous
research, this particular question has been shown to be a good predictor of a wide variety
of risky behaviors, including holding stocks, being self-employed, smoking, migrating, and
participating in sports (see, for example, Dohmen et al., 2005; Bonin et al., 2006; Jaeger
et al., 2007).
Table 4 presents regressions where the dependent variable is the response to the
survey question about willingness to take risks. Columns (1) to (4) use the same specifi-
cations as in our baseline regressions. The coefficient estimates show that in every case,
higher cognitive ability is associated with greater willingness to take risks. Coefficients on
cognitive ability are always significant at the one percent level. Thus, our baseline results
are unlikely to be explained by confusion about incentives in the choice experiments.
4.4 Arbitrage Between the Experiment and the Credit Market
A potential confound that is specific to the intertemporal choice experiment arises if people
with high cognitive ability are more likely to engage in a specific kind of arbitrage behav-
ior. In particular, it could be that some highly impatient subjects adopt a sophisticated
strategy of arbitrage. They might make patient choices in the experiment in order to take
advantage of the above-market rates of return, and then borrow outside of the experiment
at market interest rates to finance their desire for immediate consumption. If use of this
strategy is more likely for individuals with high cognitive ability, then intelligent people
could be just as impatient as those with low ability, but simply appear more patient in
the experiment because they have figured out a less expensive way to finance immediate
consumption.
To identify individuals who engaged in arbitrage, we asked at the end of the exper-
iment whether a subject had thought about market interest rates at all during the exper-
iment. Of all participants, roughly 37 percent say that they thought about an interest
larger in the second column, which gives the delayed payments, confused subjects would tend to choose
delayed payments and thus appear more patient.
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rate. This suggests that most subjects are not engaging in arbitrage at all. Interestingly,
however, thinking about market rates of return is significantly more likely for subjects
who score higher on either measure of cognitive ability.23 Thus, it is important to assess
whether our results are driven by the minority who do think about interest rates.
Table 5 presents our baseline regression specifications for impatience, but including
on the right hand side a dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual thought about market
interest rates and 0 otherwise. Thinking about interest rates does lead to a large and
statistically significant decrease in the discount rate observed in the experiment. This is
consistent with those who think about interest rates engaging in arbitrage. The more im-
portant finding for our purposes, however, is that higher cognitive ability is still associated
with a significantly lower degree of impatience.
4.5 Preferences and Test-Taking Strategy
Another potential confound would arise if risk aversion and impatience are not related to
true cognitive ability, but instead influence the type of test-taking strategy that subjects
adopt, in a way that leads to lower measured cognitive ability. For instance, suppose that
risk averse individuals take more time to provide answers in the tests of cognitive ability
because this preference partly reflects a desire to avoid losses, or mistakes. This would
lead to a lower error rate on the test, but potentially also to a lower score because subjects
answer fewer questions within the time limit. We test the hypothesis that risk aversion
has an impact on the error rates in the tests. It is less plausible that impatience would
affect the way that an individual approaches the tests of cognitive ability. The tests take
90 seconds, regardless of effort, so there is no incentive for an impatient individual to rush
through the cognitive ability exercises. Nevertheless, we also check whether impatient
individuals have higher error rates on the tests of cognitive ability.
In OLS regressions, we regress the error rates in the tests of cognitive ability on
willingness to take risks and impatience, with and without controls for personal character-
istics.24 The error rate is defined as the number of incorrect answers divided by the total
number of answers given by an individual. For both tests of cognitive ability, there is no
23 This result is based on a probit regression with a binary indicator for thinking about the interest rate
as the dependent variable and cognitive ability as the explanatory variable. These results are available
upon request.
24 Results are available upon request.
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significant impact of the risk aversion or impatience on error rates, in any specification.25
Thus, there is little indication that the baseline results reflect an impact of risk aversion
or impatience on test-taking strategy.
4.6 Are the Tests of Cognitive Ability a Proxy for Personality Type?
In this sub-section we investigate an interesting possibility, which is that performance on
cognitive tests could partly measure aspects of a subject’s personality, rather than cog-
nitive ability. For example, conscientiousness, one of the five personality traits known as
the “Big Five” in psychology, has been shown to predict performance on tests of cognitive
ability (Segal, 2006). If our measures of cognitive ability in fact proxy for personality type,
then our findings could be interpreted as revealing a link between fundamentally impor-
tant traits in economics (risk aversion and impatience) and personality traits. If this were
the case, it would be an interesting finding, with important implications.26 In our ques-
tionnaire we included standard measures of the Big Five, so we can test whether cognitive
ability has an impact on risk aversion and impatience, controlling for conscientiousness
and other dimensions of personality.
Table 6 reports regressions with the same specifications as in Table 1, but adding
controls for what psychologists have agreed are five key dimensions of personality: con-
scientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, openness, and neuroticism.27 The main con-
clusion to be drawn from Table 6 is that the coefficients on cognitive ability are still
statistically significant, even controlling for personality type. Coefficients on the measures
of cognitive ability are only slightly smaller than in Table 1, and are similarly significant,
except in column (8) where the coefficient for the word fluency test is no longer significant.
Interestingly, openness to new experience is associated with significantly greater willing-
ness to take risks, and extroversion is associated with significantly greater impatience,
although only in the regressions that use the symbol correspondence test to measure cog-
25 Point estimates are essentially zero, and none are close to being statistically significant. These results
are available upon request.
26 See Heckman et al. (2006) for a discussion of the importance of investigating the link between economic
preferences and non-cognitive skills or personality traits.
27 The Big-Five questionnaire measures personality traits by asking subjects how much they agree with
different statements about themselves. We use a fifteen item version of the questionnaire where each
trait is assessed based on level of agreement with three statements. The subject indicates the level of
agreement on a seven-point scale, and response are added across each set of three statements to achieve
a score for that personality trait. Statements are presented in random order.
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nitive ability. In summary, although there is some interesting evidence suggesting that
risk aversion and impatience are related to personality type, this does not explain the
relationship between our cognitive ability measures, risk aversion, and impatience.
4.7 Concavity of Utility and Impatient Behavior
In this final section of the analysis we investigate whether our results on impatience indi-
cate a link between cognitive ability and pure time preference, or whether they could be
driven by a tendency for people with lower cognitive ability to have more concave utility
functions (i.e. a faster rate of diminishing marginal utility of income). Note that, regard-
less of whether the underlying mechanism is time preference or concavity, it is important
that we find a robust tendency for people with lower cognitive ability to exhibit more im-
patient behavior, because of the far-reaching implications for the many economic outcomes
that are linked to investment behavior. Nevertheless, this investigation is conceptually in-
teresting because it is informative about the mechanisms underlying the observed pattern
in behavior.
The issue of concavity arises if one considers our results in light of, e.g., standard
Expected Utility Theory (EUT). We find that many people are risk averse in the lottery
experiment. In the context of EUT, risk aversion is equivalent to concavity of the in-
stantaneous utility function, and if one is willing to make particular assumptions about
the functional form of utility, it is possible to calculate risk preference in terms of a pa-
rameter describing curvature. For example, assuming CRRA utility, it is possible to use
the switching point in our lottery experiment to bound an individual’s CRRA coefficient.
A higher CRRA parameter implies a higher degree of concavity of the utility function
and therefore a higher degree of risk aversion.28 We find that risk aversion, or concav-
ity, is more prevalent among people with low cognitive ability.29 The question, then, is
28 In our choice experiment, indifference between the lottery of winning 300 Euros or 0 Euros with equal
probability and a safe option of y implies 0.5 300
1−γ
(1−γ) =
y1−γ
(1−γ) , and therefore γ = 1− (ln0.5)(lny−ln300) . Using the
safe option from the switching row in the experiment gives the lower bound for the interval containing γ
and using the safe option in the previous row gives the upper bound. Note that this calculation uses the
assumption that utility is defined only over outcomes in the experiment, rather than over final wealth
levels (for a similar approach see Holt and Laury, 2002). For a critique of inferring curvature from risk
aversion in moderate stake lotteries, however, see Rabin (2002). Alternatively, assuming a reference
point of zero when entering the experiment, the lottery choices can be interpreted as measuring the
concavity of the Kahneman and Tversky (1979) value function in the gain domain.
29 For example, coefficients in columns (2) and (4) of Table 1 imply that a one standard deviation increase
in the symbol correspondence (word fluency) score is associated with a 8.16 Euro (9.08 Euro) increase
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whether cognitive ability might affect impatient behavior indirectly, through the channel
of concavity, rather than through a direct relationship with time preference.
To see how greater concavity of utility could lead to more impatient behavior in the
intertemporal choice experiment, consider the EUT setting with exponential discounting.
Assume first that utility is locally linear for the stakes used in the inter-temporal choice
experiment. In this benchmark case, where concavity plays no role by assumption, the
relationship between the observed switching row and δ (the discount rate over a horizon
of one year) is given by the indifference condition
1 + δ =
xt+τ
xt
. (1)
where τ is one year, xt corresponds to 100 Euros available today, xt+τ is the delayed
payment of 100 + ∆ available one year later.30 Under these assumptions, we can directly
translate switching rows into discount rates.31 Now consider how concave utility u(·), such
that u′ (·) > 0 and u′′ (·) < 0, affects the relationship between the switching row and the
annual discount rate. The indifference condition in this case is given by
1 + δ =
u (xt+τ )
u (xt)
. (2)
This expression shows that for the same δ, greater concavity in the utility function leads
to more impatient behavior, in the sense of a later switching row. This follows because
u(xt+τ )
u(xt)
< xt+τxt , i.e., for a given δ, the size of the delayed payment xt+τ must be larger in the
case of concave utility, for the indifference to hold. Put differently, as concavity of utility
increases, a smaller discount rate is needed to generate the same degree of impatience in
behavior (this latter point is also made by Andersen et al., 2005). Given that we find
that risk aversion, or equivalently concavity of utility, is more pronounced for people with
low cognitive ability, this channel could potentially explain the results on the correlation
between cognitive ability and impatience, instead of a direct link between cognitive ability
in the certainty equivalent. For an individual with the median degree of risk aversion this corresponds
to a decrease in the lower bound of the CRRA parameter from 0.476 to 0.434 (0.429).
30 The choice table in the experiment were constructed using semi-annually-compounded rates δ˜, which
can be retrieved similarly as
“
1 + δ˜
2
”2
=
xt+τ
xt
.
31 For the median subject, who switches in row 11, the discount rate is in the interval from 25 to 27.5
percent, and the coefficients in columns (6) and (8) of Table 1 imply that a one standard deviation
increase in performance on the symbol correspondence or word fluency test is associated with a 2.98 or
2.30 percentage point decrease in the annual discount rate, respectively.
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and δ.32
If the true form of u(·) were known for all individuals, one could directly use condition
(2) to derive the discount rate δ that implies indifference between xt and xt+τ , and assess
empirically whether there is a relationship between δ and cognitive ability. However, since
u(·) is neither known nor directly observed, one has to make strong identifying assumptions
about the functional form as well as about the measurement of the relevant parameters of
concavity. One possibility is to assume, as above, that individuals have utility functions
of the commonly-used CRRA family. Then, for participants in the lottery experiment, we
can calculate CRRA coefficients. Since participants in the intertemporal choice experiment
do not take part in the lottery experiment, we have to impute their CRRA coefficients
based on characteristics that are observed for participants in both experiments and that
capture curvature of utility. We use two different procedures. In one case we regress
CRRA coefficients on responses to the survey risk measure, using participants in the
lottery experiment, and then use the resulting equation to predict CRRA coefficients for
participants in the intertemporal choice experiment. As an alternative approach, we use
cognitive ability to predict CRRA coefficients.33 With the predicted CRRA coefficient,
γ, for each participant in the intertemporal choice experiment, one can then calculate
the exponential discount rate implied by switching points in the intertemporal choice
experiment. This calculation simply involves applying condition (2) to the case of CRRA
preferences, i.e., 1 + δ = (xt+τ/xt)
1−γ .34 To test whether there is a relationship between
cognitive ability and discount rates, we can then regress the resulting discount rates on
cognitive ability and controls.
When using the discount rate calculated using the first CRRA measure (imputed
32 Frederick (2006) also notes that concavity of the utility or value function could affect intertemporal
choice.
33 The following results are based on linear OLS prediction equations. The 12 percent of individuals who
have unbounded intervals for the CRRA coefficient (those who never switch in the lottery choice table,
or switch immediately) are excluded from the regressions. Results are similar when, instead of basing
predictions on regression equations, we take average CRRA coefficients for different ranges of cognitive
ability (survey measure of willingness to take risks), and assign these to individuals in the intertemporal
choice experiment who fall in the same range of cognitive ability (willingness to take risks).
34 When using the survey risk measure to impute CRRA coefficients, the median imputed discount rate
is in the interval from 13.14 to 14.76 percent, as compared to the interval from 25 to 27.5 percent
implied by assuming local linearity. When using the symbol correspondence score (word fluency score)
to impute CRRA coefficients, the corresponding median imputed discount rate is in the interval from
10.87 to 12.20 (10.70 to 12.26) percent. Andersen et al. (2005) find a similar result that eliciting risk
preference and time preference jointly leads to lower estimates of the exponential discount rate.
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using the survey risk question), we find that cognitive ability has a significant impact on
time preference, in the sense of the discount rate.35 When we use the discount rates based
on the other CRRA measure (imputed based on cognitive ability), the results become
weaker, and sometimes insignificant (detailed results are displayed in Table A.2 in the
Appendix). When interpreting both sets of results, however, one has to keep in mind that
they rely on strong assumptions. For example, the results become difficult to interpret if
the assumption of CRRA utility is incorrect. Also, there is a generated regressand problem:
discount rates are obtained after imputation (and estimation), and thus discount rates
exhibit less variation than if they were calculated using the wider range of true CRRA
parameters. This problem in the dependent variable tends to increase standard errors of
coefficient estimates, making it less likely to find a significant impact of cognitive ability
on discount rates.36
As a way of circumventing the need to make strong assumptions about the form of
utility, and problems with generated regessands, we also conducted the same regressions
of impatient behavior on controls as in Table 1, but adding a control for directly observed
risk attitudes measured by the survey risk question. We allow risk attitudes to enter
non-parametrically, with a dummy variable for each value on the risk scale (the results
are displayed in columns (7) and (8) of Table A.2 in the Appendix).37 This approach
implicitly assumes that the survey risk measure captures the curvature of the unknown
utility function. This assumption is supported by the fact that responses to the question
are significantly related to CRRA coefficients in the lottery experiment sample, and by
previous evidence that the question predicts risky behaviors.38 In this case we find a
strong and significant impact of cognitive ability on impatient behavior, controlling for
curvature of utility using the survey measure of risk attitudes.
Taken together, the picture emerging from the results in this section suggests that
35 A one-standard deviation increase in the symbol correspondence test score (word fluency test score) is
associated with a 1.5 (1.2) percentage point decrease in the discount rate.
36 The generated regressand problem, which exaggerates standard errors, has the opposite effect of the
generated regressor problem, where the result is standard errors that are too small (Pagan, 1984). Note
that heteroscedasticity of the errors is also likely to arise as a consequence of the generated regressand
problem. We account for this in our estimation and report robust standard errors in Table A.2.
37 Unreported results obtained with a linear specification of the survey risk measure as control are virtually
identical.
38 See Dohmen et al. (2005), who show that responses to the general risk question predict measures of
curvature obtained from survey questions about lottery choices.
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there is a relationship between cognitive ability and pure time preference, although we
cannot completely rule out that curvature plays a role in explaining the results on impa-
tience. In any case, we find strong evidence that cognitive ability and risk preference are
related, and that cognitive ability is related to impatient choices.
5 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to investigate a simple but fundamentally important question:
whether the key traits of risk aversion and impatience are systematically related to cogni-
tive ability. In order to test this hypothesis, we used a large representative sample of the
population, incentive compatible measures of willingness to take risks and impatience, and
two tests of cognitive ability. The main finding is that people with lower cognitive ability
are significantly more risk averse, and significantly more impatient. This is true controlling
for personal characteristics, educational attainment, income, and credit constraints. The
relationship also survives a series of additional robustness checks.
The fact that risk aversion and impatience are correlated with cognitive ability has
important implications for theoretical and empirical research in economics. These traits
are usually assumed to be independent in economic models, but the results in this paper
suggest that this is a potentially important source of model miss-specification. In particu-
lar, it may be appropriate to allow for a positive correlation between cognitive ability and
risk preference, and a negative correlation between cognitive ability and discount rates.
Our findings also suggest a different interpretation of reduced form models that are esti-
mated with cognitive ability as an explanatory variable but not measures of risk aversion
or impatience. For example, consider a regression of schooling choice on cognitive abil-
ity: the coefficient on cognitive ability will partly reflect the correlation with omitted risk
aversion and impatience, which are both relevant for investments in human capital. Given
the importance of risk aversion and impatience for many other economic decisions, this is
likely to be true more generally for regressions of economic decisions on cognitive ability.
Given that cognitive ability is passed on from one generation to the next, our results also
have implications for understanding intergenerational correlation in preferences and life
choices: children may end up with similar preferences to their parents, and thus make
similar choices in life, partly due to similarity in cognitive ability. Finally, the relationship
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raises important issues for policy. For example, in early-childhood interventions, focused
on improving cognitive and non-cognitive skills, there may be important feedback effects
between cognitive ability and preferences.
An interesting topic for future research is investigating the psychological or neuro-
physiological mechanisms explaining why risk aversion and impatience are associated with
lower cognitive ability. One possibility is that cognitive ability affects a person’s capacity
for integrating choices. For example, previous research on “choice bracketing” suggests
that when some people make choices, they bracket broadly and consider the consequences
of all of the choices taken together, whereas others bracket narrowly and make each choice
in isolation (Read et al., 1999). In the context of risky choice, this can lead people to
choose to play one collection of lotteries that is first order stochastically dominated by
another available collection (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). It could potentially explain
risk aversion even in small stakes lotteries, because people fail to integrate a small individ-
ual risky decision with broader considerations, e.g., regarding the expected value of future
lifetime income. In the context of intertemporal choice, impatience could also reflect nar-
row bracketing, in the form of making choices about present consumption without fully
accounting for future consequences. Further research is needed on whether narrow brack-
eting is more likely for people with lower cognitive ability, but two recent studies provide
some preliminary evidence: Rabin and Weizsa¨cker (2007) show that narrow bracketing
is less likely in risky choice when the experimenter lowers cognitive costs for subjects by
working out the math, and Abeler and Marklein (2007) find that math grades are related
to narrow bracketing in consumption choices.
Another possibility is that choices over time, or choices between risky and safe op-
tions, are determined by the interplay of two separate decision-making systems: a cognitive
system that is relatively risk neutral, and takes into account longer-term considerations,
and an affective system that generates fear impulses in response to potential risks, or im-
pulses for immediate consumption. Consistent with this view, research on patients with
brain lesions shows that damage to affective areas is associated with increased willingness
to take risks (Shiv et al., 2005). Brain imaging also shows that greater activation of af-
fective systems in the brain, relative to cognitive systems, increases the likelihood that
someone chooses an immediate monetary reward over a larger, delayed reward (McClure
et al., 2004). It could be that our measures of cognitive ability proxy for the resources
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available to individuals for suppressing affective urges, such that higher cognitive abil-
ity indicates greater resources. This could then explain why people with lower cognitive
ability are more likely to pursue immediate consumption opportunities, or to avoid risks.
Importantly, however, establishing that cognitive ability affects risk aversion and
impatience would not rule out the potential for a more complicated relationship, in which
preferences have feedback effects on cognitive ability. For example, it could be that pa-
tience, and willingness to take risks, are traits that are conducive for the accumulation of
cognitive skills over the lifetime. Heckman (2006) and Heckman et al. (2006) argue along
these lines, suggesting the relationship between cognitive and non-cognitive skills is com-
plex, such that non-cognitive skills and personality traits cause people to endogenously
create environments that foster faster cognitive development. Our measures of cognitive
ability capture something closer to innate ability than, say, the accumulated knowledge
measured by an SAT test score. Thus there is relatively less scope for preferences to affect
performance through a channel of greater accumulated experience or knowledge.39 This
is suggestive of a causal impact of cognitive ability on preferences, but does not rule out
that there could be important feedback effects as well.40
For the ultimate cause of the relationship, it may even be necessary to think in terms
of a feedback process occurring in the evolutionary environment of humans. It could be
that more ambitious behaviors characterized by risk taking, and long-term planning, were
evolutionarily more successful when combined with high cognitive ability. On the other
hand, for types with lower cognitive ability, more conservative preferences for immediate
rewards, and safe bets, could have been the right traits for survival. Types with a taste for
risk-taking, and delay of gratification, but also low cognitive ability, may have been less
successful. Notably, evidence discussed above shows that emotional aversion to risks, and
urges for immediate consumption, are rooted in the evolutionarily older, affective system
of the brain, which was the main driver of decision making in our animal forebears, before
39 For example, the mapping in the symbol correspondence test is arbitrary, and has not been encountered
in previous education or training settings.
40 The finding from previous studies, that cognitive ability is correlated with impatience for young children,
provides an additional indication that ability causes preferences and not the other way around, to the
extent that young children have relatively little scope to shape their environments according to their own
preferences. Also, Benjamin et al. (2005) show that preferences of high school students are significantly
correlated with grades in elementary school, but do not find a statistically significant correlation with
the change in grades between elementary school and high school, suggesting that preferences do not
lead to faster accumulation of ability.
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the development of the neocortex and higher cognitive ability (see, e.g., Cohen, 2005).
This provides one tentative piece of evidence that in the case of lower cognitive ability,
a conservative preference for sure bets, and immediately available rewards, may have
been adaptive. Whether risk aversion and impatience are a good combination with low
cognitive ability in the present day, where conditions have changed substantially relative
to the adaptive environment, is an interesting open question.
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Table 4: Robustness Check: Survey Measure of Risk Preference
Dependent Variable: Willingness to take risks (Survey Measure)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standardized symbol correspondence score 0.489*** 0.268***
[0.082] [0.097]
Standardized word fluency score 0.445*** 0.333***
[0.090] [0.091]
1 if female -0.327 -0.334
[0.218] [0.223]
Age (in years) -0.021*** -0.023***
[0.006] [0.005]
Height (in cm) 0.018 0.015
[0.012] [0.012]
Constant 4.430*** 2.533 4.478*** 3.229
[0.085] [2.275] [0.087] [2.278]
log Pseudo-Likelihood -2043.99 -2019.81 -1921.23 -1897.10
Observations 902 898 848 845
The dependent variable in columns (1) to (4) is a survey measure of willingness to take risks.
Respondents rate their willingness to “take risks, in general” on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0
indicates “not at all willing” and 10 indicates ”very willing”. Scores on the symbol correspon-
dence and word fluency tests are measures of cognitive ability, standardized to have mean 0 and
standard deviation 1. Coefficients are marginal effects, estimated using interval regressions to
correct for the fact that dependent variables are elicited in intervals. Robust standard errors in
brackets; ***, **,* indicate significance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
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Table 5: Robustness Check: Arbitrage Between Experiment and Market Interest Rates
Dependent Variable: Impatience(Experimental Measure)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standardized symbol correspondence score -1.178*** -0.982**
[0.429] [0.494]
Standardized word fluency score -0.994** -0.782*
[0.447] [0.455]
1 if respondent thought about interest rate -5.894*** -5.810*** -5.725*** -5.616***
[0.857] [0.886] [0.879] [0.894]
1 if female 2.324** 2.926**
[1.158] [1.192]
Age (in years) 0.022 0.047*
[0.030] [0.027]
Height (in cm) 0.050 0.033
[0.068] [0.070]
Constant 14.188*** 3.45 14.067*** 4.745
[0.617] [12.198] [0.630] [12.693]
log Pseudo-Likelihood -1279.94 -1272.91 -1219.79 -1209.46
Observations 455 453 433 431
Dependent variable in (1) to (4) is the switching row in the intertemporal choice experiment.
Scores on the symbol correspondence and word fluency tests are measures of cognitive ability,
standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. The independent variable of interest is
an indicator for whether a subject reported thinking about market interest rates while making
decisions in the experiment measuring impatience. Coefficients are marginal effects, estimated
using interval regressions to correct for the fact that dependent variables are elicited in intervals.
Robust standard errors in brackets; ***, **, * indicate significance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level,
respectively.
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Figures
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Figure 1: Distribution of Scores in the Cognitive Skills Tests
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Note: The upper panel shows the histogram of correct responses in the symbol correspondence test. Over-
laid is the smoothed density function of the distribution of scores, estimated using a Gaussian kernel. The
bandwidth is chosen to minimize the mean integrated squared error if the data were Gaussian. A normal
density is also plotted in the graph, with the same mean and variance as the estimated function. The lower
panel of the figure shows the histogram of the number of correct recalls in the word fluency test. Graphs
of the smoothed density function, and normal density, are estimated in the same way as in the upper panel.
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Figure 2: Comparison of Standardized Distributions of Cognitive Skills for Participants in
Lottery and Intertemporal Choice Experiments
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Note: The upper panel shows the smoothed density function of the distribution of standardized scores
in the symbol correspondence for two sub-groups: participants in the lottery choice experiment and
participants in the intertemporal choice experiment. These density functions are estimated using a
Gaussian kernel with a bandwidth chosen to minimize the mean integrated squared error if the data were
Gaussian. A normal density function is overlaid for comparison. The lower panel shows the analogous
density functions for the word fluency test, separately for participants in the lottery experiment and
participants in the intertemporal choice experiment.
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Figure 3: Distributions of Choices in the Lottery and Intertemporal Choice Experiments
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Notes: The upper panel of the figure shows the distribution of choices in the lottery experiment. Values
are the safe payment necessary to induce a subject to forgo the chance to play the lottery involving
300 Euros or 0 Euros with equal probability. The lower panel shows the distribution of decisions in the
intertemporal choice experiment. Values indicate the rate of return, paid one year in the future, necessary
to induce a subject to forgo the chance to receive 100 Euros immediately.
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Figure 4: Distributions of Experimental Measures of Willingness to Take Risks and Impatience,
by Quantiles in the Cognitive Ability Distribution
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Note: The upper panel of the figure shows the average value of certainty equivalent (black dots, left
vertical axis) and average annual rate of return (light grey dots, right vertical axis) necessary to induce
switching, by quantiles of the score distribution of the symbol correspondence test. The lower panel of the
figure shows average certainty equivalents and annual rates of return for individuals in different quantiles
of the score distribution of the word fluency test.
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B Experiment Instructions and Choice Tables
In the following we present a translation of the German instructions. Instructions were
presented to the interviewer on the screen of the laptop computer, and were read aloud to
the subjects by the interviewer.
Screen 1
Now that the interview is over we invite you to participate in a behavioral experiment,
which is important for economic science. The experiment involves financial decisions,
which you can make in any way you want to. The questions are similar to those asked in
the questionnaire with the exception that THIS TIME YOU CAN EARN REAL MONEY!
I will first explain the decision problem to you. Then you will make your decisions. A
chance move will then determine whether you actually earn money.
Every 7th participant wins!
HOW MUCH MONEY YOU WILL EARN AND AT WHICH POINT IN TIME WILL
DEPEND ON YOUR DECISIONS IN THE EXPERIMENT.
If you are among the winners, your amount will be paid by check. In this case the check
will be sent to you by post.
Screen 2
Participants are now shown a choice table for the respective experiment as an example.
The table is printed on a green piece of paper and is handed to participants for them to
study.
The experimenter continues explaining how the experiment will work.
In the lottery experiment, the interviewer gave the following explanation:
In each row you see two alternatives. You can choose between
• A fixed amount that you get “for sure”
• and an “all or nothing” lottery, where with 50 percent probability you can win 300
Euros and with 50 percent probability you win nothing.
You start with row 1 and then you go down from row to row. In each row you decide
between a safe payment (column A) and the lottery (column B). The lottery is the same
in all rows. Only the amount on the safe payment (left) increases from row to row.
Which row will be relevant for your earnings will be determined by a random device later.
In the intertemporal choice experiment, the interviewer gave the following explanation:
In each row you see two alternatives. You can choose between
• A fixed amount of 100 Euro (column A “today”)
• and a somewhat higher amount, which will be paid to you only “in 12 months”
(column B).
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Payment “today” means that the check you get can be cashed immediately.
Payment “in 12 month” means that the check you get can be cashed only in 12 months.
You start with row 1 and then you go down from row to row. In each row you decide
between 100 Euro today (column A) and a higher amount (column B); please always keep
the timing of the payments in mind. The amount on the left side always remains the same,
only the amount on the right side increases from row to row.
Which row on one of the tables will be relevant for your earnings will be determined by a
random device later.
Screen 3
As you can see, you can earn a considerable amount of money. Therefore, please carefully
consider your decisions.
Can we start now?
If the participant agreed, the experiment started. If not, the experimenter said the follow-
ing:
The experiment is the part of the interview where you can earn money! Are you sure that
you DO NOT WANT TO PARTICIPATE?
If the participant still did not want to participate, the experiment was not conducted and
the participant answered a few final questions. In case the subject wanted to participate
the experiment began.
The choice table was presented to the subject on a white piece of paper. For the elicitation
of willingness to take risks, the subjects were asked to make the decisions that are listed in
Table A.3below:
Participants studied their table. Then the experimenter asked for the subject’s decision in
each row, whether they preferred the option in column A or B, starting with the first row.
In case a participant preferred the fixed payment the experimenter asked:
You have decided in favor of the fixed payment. We assume that this implies that for all
higher amounts you also prefer the safe payment, meaning that for all remaining rows all
higher amounts will be selected (i.e., column A)
If the participant did not agree, he kept on deciding between columns A and B.
In the intertemporal choice experiment, impatience over a year-long time horizon was
inferred from subjects’ choices Table A.4 shown below.
A similar procedure to the lottery experiment was followed, such that the experimenter
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Table A.3: Choices in the Risk Preference Experiment
safe payment lottery
1) e0 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning e300 and 50 percent chance of getting e0
2) e10 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning e300 and 50 percent chance of getting e0
3) e20 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning e300 and 50 percent chance of getting e0
4) e30 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning e300 and 50 percent chance of getting e0
5) e40 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning e300 and 50 percent chance of getting e0
6) e50 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning e300 and 50 percent chance of getting e0
7) e60 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning e300 and 50 percent chance of getting e0
8) e70 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning e300 and 50 percent chance of getting e0
9) e80 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning e300 and 50 percent chance of getting e0
10) e90 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning e300 and 50 percent chance of getting e0
11) e100 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning e300 and 50 percent chance of getting e0
12) e110 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning e300 and 50 percent chance of getting e0
13) e120 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning e300 and 50 percent chance of getting e0
14) e130 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning e300 and 50 percent chance of getting e0
15) e140 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning e300 and 50 percent chance of getting e0
16) e150 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning e300 and 50 percent chance of getting e0
17) e160 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning e300 and 50 percent chance of getting e0
18) e170 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning e300 and 50 percent chance of getting e0
19) e180 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning e300 and 50 percent chance of getting e0
20) e190 for sure or 50 percent chance of winning e300 and 50 percent chance of getting e0
Table A.4: Choices in the Intertemporal Choice Experiment
Column A Column B
1) e100 today or e102.5 in 12 months
2) e100 today or e105.1 in 12 months
3) e100 today or e107.6 in 12 months
4) e100 today or e110.2 in 12 months
5) e100 today or e112.8 in 12 months
6) e100 today or e115.5 in 12 months
7) e100 today or e118.2 in 12 months
8) e100 today or e121.0 in 12 months
9) e100 today or e123.7 in 12 months
10) e100 today or e126.5 in 12 months
11) e100 today or e129.3 in 12 months
12) e100 today or e132.2 in 12 months
13) e100 today or e135.1 in 12 months
14) e100 today or e138.0 in 12 months
15) e100 today or e141.0 in 12 months
16) e100 today or e144.0 in 12 months
17) e100 today or e147.0 in 12 months
18) e100 today or e150.0 in 12 months
19) e100 today or e153.1 in 12 months
20) e100 today or e156.2 in 12 months
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asked for the subject’s decision in each row, whether they preferred the option in Column
A or B, starting with the first row. In case a participant preferred the higher, delayed
amount the experimenter asked:
You have decided in favor of the higher amount of in months. We assume that this
implies that for all higher amounts you also prefer the later payment, meaning that for all
remaining rows all higher amounts will be selected (i.e., Column B)
Then it was determined whether the participant was among those who would be paid.
Participants could choose their ”lucky number” between 1 and 7. They could then press
on one out of seven fields on the computer, which represented numbers from 1 to 7. If
they hit ”their” number they won, otherwise they did not win. In case they won, it was
determined which of the tables was selected and which row of the respective table. This
was done again by pressing on fields presented to participants on the computer screen. In
the end subjects who had won were informed that they would be sent the check by mail.
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